The problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM) studies the communication efficiency of retrieving a sequence of desired L×M matrix products AB = (
Introduction
Distributed matrix multiplication is a key building block for a variety of applications that include collaborative filtering, object recognition, sensing and data fusion, cloud computing, augmented reality and machine learning. Coding techniques, such as Entangled Polynomial codes [1] and PolyDot codes [2] , have been shown to be capable of improving the efficiency of distributed matrix multiplication. However, with the expanding scope of distributed computing applications, there are mounting security concerns about sharing information with external servers. The problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication (SDMM) is motivated by these security concerns. . Various authorized users access these servers and retrieve products of their desired matrices based on the downloads that they request from all N servers. Note that unlike PIR (private information retrieval) [3] problems there are no privacy constraints in SDMM, so users can publicly announce which matrix products they wish to retrieve. The SDMM problem minimizes the average size of the total download for a generic user whose desired matrices are labeled A, B.
As defined in this work, SDMM studies the communication efficiency of retrieving desired matrix products from distributed servers where the constituent matrices are securely stored. Specifically, suppose A = (A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A S ) and B = (B 1 , B 2 , · · · , B S ) are collections of independent L×M and M × K random matrices, respectively, over a (large) finite field F q , that are stored across N servers subject to an X-security guarantee, i.e., any colluding group of up to X servers can learn nothing about the A and B matrices. A user wishes to retrieve AB = (A 1 B 1 , A 2 B 2 , · · · , A S B S ), where each A s B s , s ∈ {1, 2, · · · , S} is an L × M matrix in F q , while downloading as little information from the N servers as possible. The rate of an SDMM scheme is defined as the ratio H(AB)/D, where H(AB) is the number of bits of desired information that is retrieved, and D is the total number of bits downloaded on average. The supremum of achievable rates is called the capacity of SDMM. In this work we study the capacity of SDMM, as well as several of its variants, e.g., where the user may already have either A or B available as side-information, 1 and/or where the security constraint for either A or B may be relaxed. As our main contribution, we obtain new converse bounds, as well as new achievable schemes for various cases of SDMM, depending on the L, K, M, N, X parameters, and identify parameter regimes where these bounds match. A notable aspect of our upper bounds is a connection between SDMM and a form of private information retrieval (PIR) problem, known as multi-message X-secure T -private information retrieval (MM-XSTPIR). 2 Interesting features of our achievable schemes include the idea of cross-subspace alignment that was introduced in [6] and was recently applied to SDMM in [7] , and a novel transformation argument that converts a scalar multiplication problem into a scalar addition problem. The transformation allows a surprisingly 3 coding scheme. On the other hand, [7, 8] assume one-shot matrix multiplication, corresponding to S = 1. This leads to different approaches to achievable schemes. For example, while both this work and [7] use cross-subspace alignment, we use it to code across S blocks while [7] relies on a matrix partitioning approach.
Notations: For a positive integer N , [N ] stands for the set {1, 2, . . . , N }. The notation X [N ] denotes the set {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X N }. For an index set I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n }, X I denotes the set {X i 1 , X i 2 , . . . , X in }. We use the notation X ∼ Y to indicate that X and Y are identically distributed.
Problem Statement: SDMM
Let A = (A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A S ) represent S random matrices, chosen independently and uniformly from all matrices over F L×K q . Similarly, let B = (B 1 , B 2 , · · · , B S ) represent S random matrices, chosen independently and uniformly from all matrices over F K×M q . The user wishes to compute the products AB = (A 1 B 1 , A 2 B 2 , · · · , A S B S ).
The independence between matrices A [S] , B [S] is formalized as follows.
H(A, B) = H(A) + H(B) = s∈[S]
H(A s ) +
s∈[S]
H(B s ).
Since we are operating over F q , let us express all entropies in base q units. The A, B matrices are available at N servers with security levels X A , X B , respectively. This means that any group of up to X A colluding servers can learn nothing about A matrices, and any group of up to X B colluding servers can learn nothing about the B matrices. 6 Security is achieved by coding according to secret sharing schemes that separately generate shares A n s , B n s corresponding to each A s , B s , and make these shares 7 available to the n th server, for all n ∈ [N ].
The independence between these securely coded matrices is formalized as,
Each matrix must be recoverable from all its secret shares,
The A, B matrices must be perfectly secure from any set of secret shares that can be accessed by a set of up to X A , X B colluding servers, respectively.
6 For the most part, we will focus on cases with XA, XB ∈ {0, X}, i.e., the security level can either be X > 0 or zero, where a security level zero implies that there is no security constraint for that set of matrices. 7 If XA = 0 then we could choose A In order to retrieve the products AB, from each server n ∈ [N ], the user downloads ∆ n which is function of
The side-information available to the user apriori is denoted Ψ, which can be either the A matrices, or the B matrices, or null (φ) if the user has no side-information. Given the downloads from all N servers and the side-information, the user must be able to recover the matrix products AB.
Let us define the rate of an SDMM scheme as follows.
where D is the average value (over all realizations of A, B matrices) of the total number of qary symbols downloaded by the user from all N servers. In order to steer away from the fieldsize concerns that are best left to coding-theoretic studies, we will only allow the field size to be asymptotically large, i.e., q → ∞. The capacity of SDMM is the supremum of achievable rate values over all SDMM schemes and over all S.
Remark: The goal of the SDMM problem is to design schemes to minimize D. The normalization factor H(AB | Ψ) is not particularly important since it does not depend on the scheme, it is simply a baseline that is chosen to represent the average download needed from a centralized server that directly sends AB to the user in the absence of security constraints. Other baselines, e.g., H(AB) may be chosen instead as in [8] , or one could equivalently formulate the problem directly as a minimization of download cost D. We prefer the formulation as a rate maximization because it allows a more direct connection to the capacity of PIR, one of the main themes of this work.
Finally, depending upon which matrices are secured and/or available as side-information, we have the following versions of the SDMM problem.
SDMM version secure side-information Ψ capacity
Thus, the version of SDMM is indicated by the subscript which has two elements, the first representing the matrices that are secured and the second representing the matrices available to the user as side-information. Note that other cases, such as
, are equivalent to, SDMM (AB,B) , SDMM (B,φ) , SDMM (B,B) , SDMM (B,A) , respectively, by the inherent symmetry of the problem, leaving us with just the 5 cases tabulated above.
Results

A Connection between SDMM and MM-XSTPIR
Let us begin by identifying a connection between SDMM and multi-message X-secure T -private information retrieval (MM-XSTPIR). We refer the reader to Appendix A for a formal definition of MM-XSTPIR.
Lemma 1.
The following bounds apply.
where C MM-XSTPIR (N, X, T, K, M ) is the capacity of MM-XSTPIR with N servers, X-secure storage and T -private queries, retrieving M out of K messages.
Proof. Let us first prove the bound in (12) , by showing that when K ≥ M , then any SDMM scheme where the side-information available to the user is not 8 A, and where X B = 0, automatically yields an MM-XSTPIR(N, X A , X B , K, M ) scheme with the same rate, essentially by thinking of A as the data and B as the query. Consider MM-XSTPIR with K independent messages, each of which consists of L i.i.d. uniform symbols in F q , say arranged in a column. For all k ∈ [K], arrange these columns to form the matrix A 1 so that the k th column of A 1 represents the k th message. Let the M desired message indices be represented by the corresponding columns of the K × K identity matrix, and let these M columns be arranged to form the K × M matrix B 1 . Note that retrieving the matrix product A 1 B 1 is identical to retrieving the M desired messages. Now any (X A , X B ) secure SDMM scheme with S = 1 that does not have A as side-information, conditioned on the realizations A 1 = A 1 , B 1 = B 1 , yields an MM-XSTPIR scheme by treating A n 1 as the X A -secure data stored at the n th server and B n 1 as the X B -private query sent by the user to the n th server, for all n ∈ [N ]. For arbitrary S > 1 we can simply extend the data by a factor of S, i.e., each message is comprised of SL symbols, so that the k th message is represented by the k th columns of A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A S , treated as realizations of A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A S . Thus, conditioning on the realization B 1 = B 2 = · · · = B S = B 1 gives us the S-fold extension of the same scheme. Furthermore, since B matrices are secure, i.e., X B > 0 for all SDMM settings that appear in (12) , it follows that B is independent of B n
[S] for any n ∈ [N ]. This in turn implies that B is independent of the download ∆ n received from Server n. Therefore, conditioning on B taking values in the set that corresponds to MM-XSTPIR (i.e., B 1 restricted to any choice of M columns of the K × K identity matrix) does not affect the distribution of ∆ n , or the entropy H(∆ n ). In other words, the average download of the SDMM scheme remains unchanged as it is specialized to yield an MM-XSTPIR scheme as described above. Now, since the number of desired q-ary symbols retrieved by this feasible MM-XSTPIR scheme is SLM , the average download, D for the SDMM scheme cannot be less than SLM/C MM-XSTPIR (N, X A , X B , K, M ). Therefore, we have a bound on the rate of the SDMM scheme as
In (15) we used the fact that conditioning reduces entropy so that H(AB | B) ≤ H(AB). In (16) we used the fact that the matrix AB has SLM elements from F q , and since the uniform distribution maximizes entropy, H(AB) ≤ SLM . The bound in (13) is similarly shown, by treating B n 1 as the X A -secure data stored at the n th server and A n 1 as the X B -private query sent by the user to the n th server. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
An Upperbound on the Capacity of MM-XSTPIR
Motivated by Lemma 1, an upper bound on the capacity of MM-XSTPIR is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The capacity of MM-XSTPIR is bounded as follows.
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A.2. Note that Theorem 1 also works for trivial security or privacy, i.e., when X = 0 or T = 0.
Remark: In fact a closer connection exists between SDMM and MM-XSTPC, i.e., multi-message X-secure T -private (linear) computation problem that is an extension of the private computation problem studied in [9] . However, we use only the connection to MM-XSTPIR because this setting is simpler and the connection between SDMM and MM-XSTPIR suffices for our purpose .
Entropies of Products of Random Matrices
The following lemma is needed to evaluate the numerator in the rate expressions for SDMM schemes. 
in q-ary units.
The proof of Lemma 2 appears in Appendix B.
We now proceed to capacity characterizations for the various SDMM models.
Capacity of SDMM (AB,φ)
Let us start with the basic SDMM setting, where both matrices A, B are X-secured, and there is no prior side-information available to the user. This is essentially the two-sided secure SDMM setting considered previously in [7, 8] .
Theorem 2. The capacity of SDMM (AB,φ) , with X A = X B = X, is characterized under various settings as follows.
Case (23) is trivial because A, B are X-secure, and nothing is available to the user as sideinformation, which means that even if the user and the servers fully combine their knowledge, A, B remain a perfect secret. The converse proof for cases (24) and (27) of Theorem 2 is presented in Section 4.2. Converse proofs for all other cases follow from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. For example, consider case (25). According to (12) , (13), we have Remark: The capacity of 2-sided SDMM problem is characterized in [7] as 1 − 2X N + . Our capacity characterizations for cases (24) and (27) present a contradiction that calls into question 9 the converse bound in [7] . To further highlight the contradiction, note that in the SDMM AB,φ problem, for arbitrary L, K, M , just by retrieving each of A, B separately using the scheme described in Section 5.1, it is possible to achieve a rate equal to
which can be larger than 1 − 2X N + . Since [7] assumes S = 1, consider for example, L = K = M , and N = X + 1. Then with S = 1 this simple scheme achieves a rate
On the other hand, the achievable scheme presented in [7] does not 10 achieve the rate 1 − 
Capacity of SDMM (B,A)
The next SDMM model we consider corresponds to the one-sided SDMM problem considered in [8] .
Recall that the one-sided security model in [8] assumes that one of the matrices is a constant matrix known to everyone. This corresponds to the A matrix in our model of SDMM (B,A) because A is not secured and is available to the user as side-information. Here our capacity result is consistent with [8] .
Theorem 3. The capacity of SDMM (B,A) with X
Theorem 3 fully characterizes the capacity of SDMM (B,A) . The converse for Theorem 3 follows along the same lines as the converse presented in [8] , but for the sake of completeness we present the converse in Section 4.1. The proof of achievability provided in [8] is tight only 11 if K ≥ L and 9 The information provided by the genie to the user in the converse proof of [7] is subsequently considered useless on the basis that it is independent of AB. However, it turns out this independent side-information can still be useful in decoding AB, just as a noise term Z that is independent of AB can still be useful in decoding AB from the value AB + Z.
10 This is because H(AB) = LM when K < min(L, M ). Instead, according to Lemma 2, H(AB) = LK+KM −M 2 . So while the download for the scheme in [7] is LM N/(N −2X), the rate achieved when
The achievable scheme for the one-sided secure setting in [8] always downloads N LM/(N − X) q-ary symbols, whereas the capacity achieving scheme needs to download only N KM/(N − X) q-ary symbols when K < L.
L is a multiple of N − X. Therefore, a complete proof of achievability is needed for Theorem 3. Such a proof is presented in Section 5.3.1.
Capacity of SDMM (B,B)
Theorem 4. The capacity of SDMM (B,B) , with X A = 0, X B = X, is characterized under various settings as follows.
The converse for K ≤ M is trivial because the capacity by definition cannot exceed 1. The converse for the remaining cases follows directly from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. 
Capacity of SDMM (B,φ)
Theorem 5. The capacity of SDMM (B,φ) , with X A = 0, X B = X, is characterized under various settings as follows.
The case N ≤ X is trivial because B must be X-secure and there is no side-information at the user, which means that neither the user, nor all servers together have any knowledge of B. The converse for (37) and (40) follows from the fact that any SDMM B,φ scheme is also a valid SDMM B,A scheme, so the download, say D B,φ for the best SDMM B,φ scheme cannot be less than the download, say D B,A for the best SDMM B,A scheme. For (38) the converse follows directly from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. The converse for (39) is trivial because the capacity can never be more than 1 by definition. Finally, the converse for (41) also follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1. The achievability results for Theorem 5 are proved in Section 5.3.3.
Capacity of SDMM AB,B
Theorem 6. The capacity of SDMM (AB,B) , with X A = X B = X, is characterized under various settings as follows.
The case (42) with N ≤ X is trivial because the A is X-secure and not available to the user as side-information, which means that it is unknown to both the user and all servers. The converse for (43) follows from the observation that relaxing the security constraint for B cannot hurt, so C (AB,B) is bounded above by C (A,B) , which is equal to C (B,A) = 1 − 
Converse
Proof of Converse for Theorem 3
The case N ≤ X is trivial because B must be X-secure and not available to the user as sideinformation, which means that neither the user, nor all servers together have any knowledge of B. Now let us consider the case N > X. Let X denote any subset of [N ] such that |X | = X. We start with the following lemma.
Proof.
(52)
= 0.
The steps in the proof are justified as follows.
Step (47) applies the definition of mutual information.
Step (48) follows from the fact that (AB, A) is function of (A, B) and conditioning reduces entropy.
Step (49) applies the definition of mutual information, and (50) holds because ∆ X is function of (52) and (53), we repeatedly used the chain rule and non-negativity of mutual information. The last step follows from the security constraint defined in (6) and separate encoding of matrices (2) . The proof is completed by the non-negativity of mutual information.
The proof of converse of Theorem 3 is now presented as follows.
Steps are justified as follows. (55) subtracts and adds the same term so nothing changes. (56) follows from the correctness constraint, (9) . Steps (57) and (58) follow from the definition of mutual information. In (59), we used the fact that dropping terms reduces entropy. The last step holds from Lemma 3. Averaging (60) over all choices of X and applying Han's inequality (Theorem 17.6.1 in [10]), we have
Thus we obtain
Converse of Theorem 2: (24),(27)
Let X denote any subset of [N ] such that |X | = X. The proof of converse is as follows.
Steps are justified as follows. (68) subtracts and adds the same term so nothing changes. (69) follows from (9), while (70) and (71) follow from the definition of mutual information. (72) holds because adding conditioning reduces entropy and AB is function of (A, B). (73) holds because dropping terms reduces entropy. The last step simply follows from the following fact,
where (75) is the security constraint defined in (7) . (76) follows from non-negativity of mutual information and the fact that ∆ X is function of (
is the definition of mutual information.
Averaging (74) over all choices of X and applying Han's inequality, we have
Achievability
Let us present two basic schemes that are essential ingredients of the proofs of achievability.
A General Scheme
This scheme allows the user to retrieve all A, B, after which he can locally compute AB. Let S = N − X, and let
be uniformly distributed random matrices over F L×K q and F K×M q respectively. Note that X A , X B ∈ {0, X}. The independence of these random matrices and matrices A [S] , B [S] is specified as follows.
Let α n , n ∈ [N ] be N distinct elements from F q . The construction of securely encoded matrices A n s and B n s for any s ∈ [S] and n ∈ [N ] is provided below.
The answer from the n-th server is specified as follows
Note that the desired matrices and the random matrices are coded with an RS code. Therefore, from the answers provided by all N servers, the user is able to decode all matrices A [S] , B [S] , and then determine AB = (A s × B s ) s∈ [S] . Note that X A -security is guaranteed for matrices A s because they are protected by the X A noise matrices Z sx , x ∈ [X A ], that are i.i.d. uniform and coded according to MDS(X A , N ). Similarly, X B -security is guaranteed for matrices B s .
Cross Subspace Alignment Based Scheme
For this scheme, let us set
And let 
For the construction of this scheme, we will need S distinct constants f s ∈ F q , s ∈ [S], and N distinct constants α n , n ∈ [N ] that are elements of G,
The securely encoded matrix A n s for any s ∈ [S] and n ∈ [N ] is provided below.
Similarly, the securely encoded matrix B n s for any s ∈ [S] and n ∈ [N ] is as follows,
The download from any server n, n ∈ [N ] is constructed as follows.
Each of the last three terms can be expanded into weighted sums of terms of the form α t n , t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , X A + X B − 1}. Thus, upon receiving all N answers from servers, the user is able to decode all S desired product matrices (A s × B s ) s∈ [S] , as long as the following N × N matrix is invertible,
which is shown to be true by Lemma 11. The proof of Lemma 11, which is based on the proof of Lemma 5 in [6] , is presented in Appendix C. X A -security is guaranteed for matrices A s because they are protected by the X A noise matrices Z sx , x ∈ [X A ], that are i.i.d. uniform and coded according to MDS(X A , N ) codes. X B -security is similarly guaranteed for the matrices B s , s ∈ [S].
Proofs of Achievability
Throughout these proofs, we will allow q → ∞. Furthermore, we will use Lemma 2 to calculate the entropy of random matrices.
Achievability Proof of Theorem 3
First, let us consider the setting when K ≥ L. For this setting, let us apply the cross subspace alignment based scheme presented in Section 5.2. Note that X A = 0, X B = X, and the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is N LM , so the rate achieved is
which matches the capacity for this setting. On the other hand, when K < L, let us apply the general scheme presented in Section 5.1. Since X A = 0, X B = X, we have
But note that left matrices A [S] are already available to the user as side information, so it is not necessary to download (α n A 1 + · · · + α S n A S ) terms. Therefore, the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is N KM , and the rate achieved is
which matches the capacity for this setting. This completes the achievability proof of Theorem 3.
Achievability Proof for Theorem 4
First consider the trivial scheme with S = 1 that downloads the matrices A [S] directly from any one out of N servers, since there is no security constraint on these matrices (X A = 0). Since B [S] is already available as side information, downloading A [S] allows the user to compute AB locally. The rate achieved with this scheme is
Thus, this simple scheme is optimal for K ≤ M and for (K > M, N ≤ X). Next let us consider N > X as K/M → ∞. For this, let us apply the cross subspace alignment based scheme presented in Section 5.2 with S = N − X. Note that X A = 0, X B = X, and the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is N LM , so the rate achieved is
which matches the capacity for this setting. This completes the achievability proof of Theorem 4.
Achievability Proof for Theorem 5
For the cases (37), (38), let us apply the cross subspace alignment based scheme presented in Section 5.2 with S = N − X. Since X A = 0, X B = X, and the total number of downloaded q-ary symbol is N LM , the rate achieved is
This completes the achievability proof of Theorem 5 for the cases (37), (38). Now consider the cases (39) and (40). For these cases, let us apply the general scheme presented in Section 5.1. Since X A = 0, X B = X, we have
Note that from the downloads ∆ n of any S servers, we are able to recover the matrices A [S] , so we can eliminate the first part from the remaining N − S redundant downloads while preserving decodability. Therefore, the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is SLK + N KM . Thus, as q → ∞, the rate achieved is
As L/M → ∞ and when M ≥ K, we have R = 1. This completes the proof of achievability of (39). On the other hand, when M/L → ∞ and K < L, we have
This proves achievability for (40), thus completing the proof of achievability for Theorem 5.
Achievability Proof of Theorem 6
Let us start with the cases (43) and (44), for which we apply the general scheme presented in Section 5.1. Since X A = X B = X, we have
Now we note that since the matrices B [S] are available to user as side information, it is not necessary to download the second part of ∆ n . Therefore, the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is N LK, and the rate achieved is
This completes the achievability proof for cases (43) and (44). Next, let us consider case (45), and for this setting let us apply the cross subspace alignment based scheme presented in Section 5.2. Note that X A = X B = X, and the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is N LM , so the rate achieved is
which matches the capacity for this setting.
Achievability Proof of Theorem 2
Let us start with case (26), for which we apply the cross subspace alignment based scheme that was presented in Section 5.2. Note that X A = X B = X, and the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is N LM , so the rate achieved is
Next, consider case (27). For this setting, let us apply the general scheme presented in Section 5.1. Since X A = X B = X, we have
Thus the total number of downloaded q-ary symbols is N (LK + KM ). Therefore, when K ≤ min(L, M ), we have
This completes the achievability proof of case (27).
Achievability Proof of Theorem 2: Case (24)
Let us first consider the setting where K = L = M = 1, and let us set S = N − X. Note that in this setting, A s , B s are independent scalars drawn uniformly from the finite field F q . Let us first present a solution based on the assumption that A s , B s take only non-zero values for all s ∈ [S]. It is well-known that the multiplicative group F × q = F q \ {0} is a cyclic group. Moreover, every finite cyclic group of order q − 1 is isomorphic to the additive group of Z/(q − 1)Z (i.e., addition modulo (q − 1)). Therefore it is possible to translate scalar multiplication over F × q into addition modulo (q − 1). However, the additive group of Z/(q − 1)Z is not a field, and our scheme will further require the properties of a field. This problem is circumvented by using a prime field F p for a prime p such that p > 2(q − 1) and noting that for any two integers a, b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 2}, we have
In other words, suppose the isomorphism between the multiplicative group F × q and the additive group Z/(q −1)Z maps all a ∈ F × q to f (a) ∈ Z/(q −1)Z. Then for all a, b, c ∈ F × q such that c = a×b, we have f (c) = f (a) + f (b) in Z/(q − 1)Z, and furthermore, under the natural interpretation of all f (a) as elements of F p , we have c ′ = f (a) + f (b) in F p such that f (c) = c ′ mod (q − 1). Thus, we are able to transform the problem of scalar multiplication in F × q to scalar addition over F p , i.e., instead of c = a × b ∈ F × q , the user will retrieve c ′ = f (a) + f (b) ∈ F p from which he can compute f (c) by a mod q − 1 operation, and then from f (c) the user can compute c by inverting the isomorphic mapping.
To account for potential zero values of A s , B s ∈ F q , let us define f (0) = 0. In light of this discussion, let us assume f (A s ), f (B s ) are scalars in F p and the user wishes to retrieve f (A s ) + f (B s ) ∈ F p for all those s ∈ [S] where A s , B s are both non-zero, and he wishes to retrieve the answer 0 for all those s ∈ [S] where either one of A s , B s is zero. Now let us present a scheme to achieve this task. For this scheme let us choose p to be the minimum prime number such that
be uniformly distributed random (noise) scalars over F p . The independence of these random scalars and the scalars f (A s ), f (B s ) is specified as follows.
Let α n , n ∈ [N ] be N distinct elements from F p . The construction of A n s and B n s for any s ∈ [S] and n ∈ [N ] is provided as follows.
The answer from the n-th server is obtained as follows
X-security is guaranteed because matrices A s , B s are protected by noise terms that are i.i.d. uniform and coded according to MDS(X, N ) codes. Note that desired scalars and random scalars are coded with an RS code, and S +X = N . Therefore, from the answers provided by all N servers, the user is able to decode (A s + B s ) s∈ [S] . By the transformation argument, correctness is guaranteed for all those s ∈ [S], where A s = 0 and B s = 0. However, correctness is not yet guaranteed for those s ∈ [S] where either A s = 0 or B s = 0. For this we will implement a separate mechanism to let the user know which A s and B s are equal to zero, so he can infer correctly that A s B s = 0 for those instances. Specifically, for each scalar A s and B s , let us define binary symbols η As , η Bs that indicate whether or not A s , B s are equal to zero. These η As , η Bs are also secret-shared among the N servers in an X-secure fashion, and retrieved by the user at negligible increase in download cost as q → ∞. Now, by the Bertrand-Chebyshev theorem, for every integer ν > 1 there is always at least one prime p ′ such that ν < p ′ < 2ν, thus we must have p such that 2(q − 1) < p < 4(q − 1). Therefore, as q → ∞, the rate achieved is
which approaches 1 − X/N as q → ∞.
Now let us consider the setting with arbitrary L, M , and with K = 1, i.e., the user wishes to compute the outer product of vectors A s , B s for all s ∈ [S]. As before, let us set S = N − X, and choose p to be the smallest prime such that p > 2(q − 1). We will allow the user to download a normalized version of each A s and B s vector, along with the product of the normalizing factors, from which the user can construct A s B s . To this end, let us define i s , j s as the index of the first non-zero element in A s , B s , respectively, and normalize each vector A s by it's i th s element A s (i s ), each vector B s by it's j th s element B s (j s ) ∀s ∈ [S]. Now ∀s ∈ [S] such that A s is not the zero vector, we have
where the vector A ′ s is the normalized vector. Similarly, ∀s ∈ [S] such that B s is not the zero vector, we have
Note that if A s or B s is the zero vector, then we simply set i s = 0, j s = 0 and A ′ s = 0, B ′ s = 0, and A s (i s ) = 1, B s (j s ) = 1, respectively. The scheme is constructed as follows. Separate X-secure secret sharing schemes are used to distribute the secrets − 1) ). Note that since A s (i s )B s (j s ) is always non-zero there is no need for downloading additional indicators needed to identify zero values. The correctness follows from the fact that
and by the construction of the scheme, (A s (i s )B s (j s )) and A ′ s × B ′ s are recoverable for all s ∈ [S]. Therefore, the rate achieved is
which approaches 1 − X N as q → ∞. This proves achievability of case (24), and completes the achievability proof of Theorem 2.
Conclusion
A class of Secure Distributed Matrix Multiplication (SDMM) problems was defined in this work, and its capacity characterized in various parameter regimes depending on the security level X, number of servers N , matrix dimensions L, M, K and the set of matrices that are secured or available to the users as side-information. Notable aspects include connections between SDMM and a form of PIR known as MM-XSTPIR that led us to various converse bounds, and crosssubspace alignment schemes along with monomorphic transformations from scalar multiplication to scalar addition that formed the basis of some of the achievable schemes. Note that most of the achievable schemes in this work can also be adapted to the one-shot matrix multiplication framework of [7, 8] , say where L, K, M all approach infinity and the ratios L/K, K/M are fixed constants. The converse parts follow directly, for the achievability parts, we can adapt our schemes to one-shot matrix multiplication based on matrix partitioning and zero-padding. For example, consider the cross subspace alignment based scheme in Section 5.2. Let us define L 1 = ⌊L/S ′ ⌋S ′ , where S ′ = N − X A − X B . Now let us partition matrix A as follows.
where 
Note that the extra cost of zero-padding is upper bounded by KS ′ /LK = S ′ /L, which goes to zero as L → ∞. Thus the desired rates are still achievable. In terms of future work, open problems that merit immediate attention include the many cases of SDMM where the capacity remains open. For example, the capacity of the basic SDMM (AB,φ) setting, previously believed to be solved in [7] is shown to be still open in general, including the important case of square matrices L = K = M > 1 with sufficiently many servers N > X. From the case L = K = M = 1 that is already solved in this work, it seems that the generalization could require expanding the scope of constructions based on non-trivial monomorphic transformations, which presents an interesting research avenue. In terms of the connection to PIR, this work highlights the importance of finding the capacity characterizations for MM-XSTPIR, as well as MM-XSTPC. Evidently solutions to these PIR problems would not only add to the growing literature on PIR that already includes many successful capacity characterizations [6, 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , but also have a ripple effect on important problems that are intimately connected to PIR. Similar to PIR, the models of SDMM could also be further enriched to include privacy of retrieved information, coded storage [14, 16, 17] , storage size and repair constraints [18] [19] [20] and generalized forms of side-information [21] [22] [23] . Thus, just like PIR, SDMM offers a fertile research landscape for discovering new coding structures and converse arguments.
A Multi-Message X-Secure T -Private Information Retrieval
A.1 Problem Statement
Consider K messages stored at N distributed servers, W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W K . Each message is represented by L random symbols from the finite field F q .
in q-ary units. The information stored at the n-th server is denoted by S n , n ∈ [N ]. X-secure storage, 0 ≤ X ≤ N , guarantees that any X (or fewer) colluding servers learns nothing about messages.
To make information retrieval possible, messages must be function of S [N ] .
The multi-message T -private information retrieval allows the user to retrieve M messages simultaneously. The user privately and uniformly generate a set of indices of desired messages K,
To retrieve desired messages privately, the user generates N queries
. The n-th query Q K n is sent to the n-th server. The user has no prior knowledge of information stored at servers, i.e.,
I(S
T -privacy, 0 ≤ T ≤ N , guarantees that any T (or fewer) colluding servers learns nothing about K.
Upon receiving user's query Q K n , the n-th server responds user with an answer A K n , which is function of the query and its storage, i.e.,
The user must be able to recover desired messages W K from all answers
The rate of a multi-message XSTPIR scheme is defined by the number of q-ary symbols of desired messages that are retrieved per downloaded q-ary symbol,
n is expected number of downloaded q-ary symbols from all servers. The capacity of multi-message XSTPIR is the supremum of rate over all feasible schemes, denoted as
Note that setting X = 0 reduces the problem to basic multi-message T -private information retrieval where storage is not secure. The setting T = 0 reduces the problem to X-secure storage with no privacy constraint.
A.2 Upper Bound of the Capacity of Multi-Message XSTPIR
To prove Theorem 1, we need following lemmas.
Proof. It suffices to prove
The proof is presented as follows.
=0.
Steps are justified as follows. (168) (171) follows from the chain rule and non-negativity of mutual information. In last step, we simply used (161) and (162). This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Steps are justified as follows. (175) 
Steps are justified as follows. [N ] , S X ) according to (163) . (192) is the definition of mutual information, while (193) follows from the fact that dropping conditions can not reduce entropy. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
Averaging over all X , we have
Therefore we have
(221) follows from the Han's inequality, and (222) follows from (163) and (164). (222) is the chain rule of entropy, while the last step holds from Lemma 7 and the fact that K i 's are disjoint sets. Now let us apply (224) repeatedly for i = 1, 2, . . . ,
Thus we have
Therefore,
So we have,
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 1:
Note that when X = 0, i.e., the basic multi-message T -private information retrieval problem where storage is not secure, the proof of Theorem 1 follows directly, and the resulting upper bound is obtained by setting X = 0.
Remark 2: Note that when T = 0, i.e., the problem with X-secure storage and no privacy requirement, we have 
Proof. Define σ as 0 ifB is singular, and 1 otherwise. Then we have H(ĀB |B) = H(ĀB |B, σ)
= H(ĀB |B, σ = 1)P (σ = 1) + H(ĀB |B, σ = 0)P (σ = 0)
= H(Ā |B, σ = 1)P (σ = 1) + H(ĀB |B, σ = 0)P (σ = 0)
= H(Ā)P (σ = 1) + H(ĀB |B, σ = 0)P (σ = 0)
= H(Ā)
In (237) we used the fact that given a square non-singular (invertible) matrixB, the matrixĀB is an invertible function of the matrixĀ. In (239) we used the result from [24] that the probability of a matrixB drawn uniformly from F k×k q being singular is exactly 1 − k i=1 (1 − q −1 ). Now, since H(ĀB |B, σ = 0) is a finite value bounded between 0 and lk, as q → ∞ we have H(ĀB |B) = H(Ā).
The random matrices A, B in the next two lemmas are as defined in Lemma 2. Note that we assume that q → ∞ throughout the remainder of this section. 
Similarly, let us express B as
Then we have
Proof. As q → ∞, the square matrix B 1 is invertible with probability 1. Therefore, using 
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2: (20)
Proof. Case 1. K ≤ min(L, M ). First, let us consider the upper bound. Note that we can rewrite matrix A as
Similarly, let us rewrite matrix B as
Note that as q → ∞, square matrices A 1 and B 1 are invertible with probability 1. Thus we have
Then we have 
in q-ary units. This completes the proof of (20) for Case 1. Case 2. M ≤ min(L, K). Let us consider the upper bound first. Since AB has dimension L × M , it is trivial that H(AB) ≤ LM in q-ary units. On the other hand, from Lemma 9, we have H(AB) ≥ H(AB | B 1 , B 2 , A 2 ) = H(A 1 ) = LM in q-ary units. This completes the proof of (20) for Case 2.
Case 3. L ≤ min(K, M ). By symmetry this case is identical to Case 2. This completes the proof of (20) 
Proof. Proof of Lemma 11 is almost identical to that of Lemma 5 in [6] . The only difference is that since f [S] are distinct S elements from F q , (117) in [6] becomes
Now choosing α such that (f i + α) = 0 gives us c 1 = · · · = c S = 0. Other parts of the proof in [6] apply directly. This completes the proof of Lemma 11.
